Luciana Santos: Opening pathways in the struggle in defence of democracy
Speech of the national president of PCdoB, Luciana Santos, on November 30, at the opening of the Central Committee meeting.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil – PCdoB holds a historic meeting. At this particular moment in the country’s life, the Communists meet to analyse the character of the new government under the leadership of Jair Bolsonaro, and the factors that contributed to his victory. We also started the debate about our tactics in this new context and the construction of resistance. We are evaluating our participation in the electoral process and discussing measures to overcome the electoral threshold (the “barrier clause”) in a process of high-level talks with the National Direction of the Free Homeland Party (Partido Pátria Livre – PPL).
We start by the realization that the political cycle started in 1985, with the end of the military dictatorship, was the result of the struggle of different generations in the defence of democracy, and against the regime of exception. This cycle, which had its climax in the 1988 Constitution, is put in question by the election of Bolsonaro.
This meeting aims to prepare our forces to face this reality, for the fight in the sphere of mass struggle, in the battle of ideas and institutional action. We have the challenge of building a broad and flexible movement for democracy. The struggle that is approaching is of great magnitude. However, politics is the field of dispute, of indeterminacy, not of certainties. Broad sectors in the defense of democracy can change the course of the winds.
The international scenery is marked by crisis and the rise of retrograde forces
Bolsonaro’s election took place in an international scenario marked by the aggravation of the crisis of capitalism which, with its contemporary features, is less and less compatible with democracy. Consequently, it is a favourable condition for the growth of the far-right forces. In this scenery, there is still an intense struggle for the configurations of the international order.
The economic crisis of 2007-2008 has produced millions of unemployed people, extracted rights, weakened nations, and produced countless political consequences. The austerity measures adopted in Europe have further increased the gap between capital and labour and have contributed to a growing questioning of the political forces driving the process. The old cosmopolitan political liberalism, which has shaped the European Union and multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), has been questioned by a new right wing that is ultraliberal in the economy, authoritarian in politics and retrograde in customs.
Retrograde forces, portraying themselves as the restorers of order and manipulating the national flag, have galvanized important political results. The growth of obscurantist forces in the old continent is robust. The extreme right-wing is in power in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Ukraine. It is part of the governmental majority in Italy, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, and a significant force in France, and has resurfaced in Spain. In the next May 2019 elections for the European Parliament the extreme right is expected to consolidate a role as the third political force. This same wave produced the victories of Donald Trump in the United States and Brexit in the United Kingdom. The wave in which Bolsonaro surfs, therefore, spreads worldwide.
Brazil and the building of a multipolar world
In the last decade, Brazil has advanced in building an important autonomous development. It sought to internationalize its companies, formed a regional pole in South America under its leadership, contributed to the BRICS articulation (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and discovered strategic, therefore coveted, oil reserves.
We are living in a time when the centrality of the national question emerges strongly. To a large extent, it is around that question that the disputes over the reordering of the international develop. To remain at the centre of power, the imperialist powers adopt neo-colonial policies toward other nations and prevent the emergence of sovereign national projects.
Forcing Brazil to distance itself from these initiatives, to adopt a new alignment with the United States, to relax its sovereignty over strategic resources and to distance itself from initiatives such as BRICS, has ultimately contributed to the maintenance of the current international order.
Factors that influenced the rise of backward forces in Brazil
In addition to these external elements, the election of Bolsonaro was the consequence of a set of factors that are still to be better evaluated, so that we can draw lessons to carry out the opposition. In order to begin this reflection, we highlight some elements that, in our view, deserve to be deeply analysed and developed.
The existence of exponents of fascist forces in Brazil is not something essentially new. In the 1930s, in the wake of the economic crisis of 1929, one of the most powerful political movements was the Brazilian Integralist Action, an autochthonous expression of fascism. Under the motto God, Homeland and Family, the movement, with a strong social base, made extensive use of religion, moralism and the fight against “communism” as its political expression. Today, the heirs of this movement are in different extreme right movements in Brazil.
At the 2013 Jornadas de Junho[1], an intense political and ideological dispute developed, which, to some extent, we have lost. Space was opened up for the emergence of retrograde movements on the streets and for a long period of tension and instability, which culminated in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff.
The Lava Jato[2] Operation, with its strong component of external cooperation, became a crusade led by Judge Sergio Moro against the political system and, in particular, against former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. His goal in the last period was to remove Lula from the presidential dispute. It was certainly one of the determining factors of the electoral result.
The environment of a general denial of politics, cultivated since 2013 and strengthened by the Lava Jato Operation, spread to the point of 86% of the population saying they were displeased with politicians. In the 2016 elections several characters who presented themselves as outsiders were elected, such as the mayor of Belo Horizonte, Alexandre Kalil, and of the city of São Paulo, João Doria.
Through social networks, with external support and making use of large databases, these far-right groups found the way and tools to organize and diffuse their repertoire. WhatsApp technology was decisive for the establishment of an agenda of moral issues, and for the spread of fake news, in opposition to the central themes of the debate on the country’s course.
The elections that were being marked by the victimization, due to Lula’s imprisonment, changed routes with the stabbing attack suffered by Bolsonaro. This has strongly contributed to increasing the electoral process’ drama and, even being medically able to participate in the political debates on national TV, Bolsonaro took advantage of the tragedy not to attend these events.
A broad political and social front was formed against the presence of left-wing forces in government. The candidate with the possibility of defeating the left would receive support from the establishment.
In November 2017, during its 14th Congress, PCdoB has approved a resolution that guided the creation of a front with broad sectors of society to defend a new national development project. Its construction, however, was met with resistance in several sectors and the result was that not even in the field of the left was there unity around an electoral candidacy.
The electoral debate and the end of a political cycle
In times of crisis and disruption, people look for anchors, ways of containing uncertainty and insecurity. At the same time, they seek for an authority capable of restoring order. Bolsonaro’s candidacy was able to construct a speech attending to these feelings.
As stated then, it would be very difficult for a candidate to be elected in Brazil by defending a minimum State programme, supported by privatization and the “reform” of Social Security. Bolsonaro incarnated the anti-system and made a banner with the anti-PT[3] feeling, with a discourse of false battle against corruption, against the political game, the “reds”, privileges, and violence, and in defense of the “Brazilian family’s values”. There was much debate over whether the “gay kit”[4] was real or not, but there was very little talk about government program or about a project for the country, as usually debated in presidential elections.
Bolsonaro’s election came about tainted by private funding and false news, intimidation, and the abuse of power of State exponents. However, the Fernando Haddad-Manuela D’Ávila (PT-PCdoB) candidacy got more than 47 million votes, surpassing 45% of the Brazilian electorate – a result preceded by the mobilization of broad democratic sectors. The last week of the campaign showed the vigour of a broad front in defense of democracy, rights and freedom.
This electoral result puts an end to the political cycle that began with the end of the military dictatorship, and which had in the struggle for amnesty, in the electoral college dispute and in the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, an important cycle of democratic achievements and progress. For most of that thirty-year period, tucanos and petistas[5] led antagonistic coalitions, disputing six successive presidential elections. These forces possessed a common understanding in terms of conviviality and visions of civilizational achievements. With Bolsonaro’s election, this framework is in an open question.
A first characterization of the new regime being formed
One of the central challenges of this first debate is to achieve an initial characterization of the Bolsonaro’s government, its objectives and contradictions. At first glance, the impression is that it is an ultraliberal government in the economy, authoritarian in politics and retrograde in customs. There is no clear and definite project for the country. What exist are multiple nuclei, with their own agendas and visions, often contradictory, but also with a certain level of convergence in some respects. Among the aspects bonding this group are the removal of the left-wing from power, the denial of politics and a “reform” of the State that reviews essential aspects of the 1988 Constitution, such as people’s rights and the State’s size.
Bolsonaro is a singular phenomenon. His speech showcases a worldview that brings us back to the Cold War and the need to fight a domestic enemy, in this case the opposition. His authoritarian character bears marks of the “lead years”[6] and denotes fascist traits.
However, it is necessary to point out that, despite Bolsonaro’s victory, the Brazilian electorate is not all right-wing, far less of an extreme right. It is an electorate that witnesses politics wearing down, sees its problems without solution, feels the impacts of the crisis and finds a force bearing a mobilizing speech that promises to put things in place and impose a certain order on chaos.
Likewise, it is not possible to state that the votes given to Bolsonaro are a ratification of the project of privatizations and dismantling of the State. Especially because that agenda was overshadowed throughout the campaign. Little was debated about a project for the country, about how to face unemployment, how to make Brazil return to the path of development. Much was said about behavioural issues, and the possession of firearms.
Bolsonaro has sought to present his as a government of rupture with politics, in the way to relate to the Parliament, in distancing from the political parties to form the government and, consequently, seeking to create a new dynamic that replaces the so-called “coalitional presidentialism”. It remains to be seen whether his government will be able to approve “reforms” and other projects. The very decrease in the number of ministries and the creation of ministerial superstructures are ultimately aimed at creating fiefdoms and reducing the incidence of politics in conducing the country’s course.
Bolsonaro will act to polarization in society high and ensure engagement from his networks. His is a government that has a loyal and sectarian militancy that must be constantly mobilized. Anyone who opposes any of its measures will promptly be accused of being an enemy, of being against Brazil. It is in the government’s interest to keep the controversy open and manipulate the polarization of society. He knows that it will be the discourse of cultural warfare, values and political radicalism that he will keep his social networks alive and connected.
Power poles of Bolsonaro’s government
1 – The military uniform. It composes the majority of the government, being seven until now (including the vice-president, General Hamilton Mourão). It brings together the most prepared cadres, but in general, with a retrograde view of the political forces. They are located in strategic positions and appear to act as a cordon of isolation from political pressures. They have their own project and vision about the country’s development and strategic interests. Mourão, in a recent interview, made clear the disagreement with important aspects of the agenda proposed by Paulo Guedes[7] and expressed by Eduardo Bolsonaro[8] for foreign policy. It is worth mentioning the concern of General Eduardo Villas-Boas[9] about the risks of politicization and hierarchical breakdown in the Armed Forces, due to the large number of military personnel involved in the government.
2 – The judge robe. It is essentially the Java Jato Operation “Party”, which is present through the portion of the Judiciary Power that has acted in recent years to implode the political system and distance the left forces from government. It is the expression of a new type of authoritarianism. Its members act within the margins of legality, functioning in the form of a state of exception that stifles the Democratic Rule of Law. In the super-ministry structure, the format is similar to that of Lava Jato Operation, apparently prioritizing the issue of corruption rather than public security. It remains to be seen whether their cannons will remain pointed exclusively at the left.
3 – Banks. In the Bolsonaro government, there will be no intermediaries. Now the men of big corporations and big banks are the ones directly and autonomously conducting the government’s economic policy. The team formed by Paulo Guedes makes clear the predominance of private interests over the public and social ones. Its agenda is privatization, financial overture and a strong contradiction with industry. It will need the National Congress to carry out an expressive part of the “reforms” and privatizations. In addition, this agenda can enter a collision course with the military pole and with characters like the new chancellor.
4 – The clan. It is the most heterogeneous, composed of the sons of the elected president, by exponents of evangelical groups, and has the philosopher-astrologer Olavo de Carvalho as one of the intellectual mentors. It is the most aggressive pole of the future government. It advocated for the closure of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and the criminalization of “communism”, and has proposed a security agenda based on the possession of firearms, besides the “gag law” (the proposal of a School without Party)[10], among others.
One of his sons, Eduardo Bolsonaro, stands out in this pole, seeking to create bases for an international projection of the captain-president[11] as a leader of the conservative world, in alliance with the most retrograde in the world arena. From this pole has emerged the most ideological appointments of the Bolsonaro government: that of the ministers Ernesto Araújo (Foreign Relations) and Ricardo Velez Rodrigues (Education). In recent days, the other son Carlos Bolsonaro (councilman in Rio de Janeiro city) has raised the thesis of threats of integrity to the life of the elected president.
The Brazil that Bolsonaro will have to govern and the announcement of the first measures
When Bolsonaro takes office, he will have on his shoulders the responsibility of facing a complex economic and social situation. The new government will begin amid the worsening of the international crisis, with the country marked by pessimism. The world economy shows signs of a new spiral of deceleration, aggravated by the US trade war against China.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) projects a slowdown in world economic growth, from 3.7 percent this year to 3.5 percent in 2019. The FED, the United States’ central bank, projects a sharp slowdown of the US economy from 3.1% this year to 1.8% in 2021. China, according to the OECD, will grow by 6.6% in 2018 and is expected to fall to 6 % in 2020. In developing countries such as Turkey, Argentina and Brazil, the pressure from the rising US dollar, as well as the high in interest rates in the United States, may trigger further turbulence.
Regarding Brazil, the OECD reduced its projections for economic growth in 2019 from 2.5% to 2.1%, according to its report. Results of government actions in the economic sphere will be more complicated and time-consuming, since they depend to a large extent on approval in the National Congress, which may have convergence with certain economic agendas, but will wish to impose itself as autonomous power.
The lack of a policy for the industrial sector, responsible for 32% of federal taxes, 51% of Brazilian exports and 21% of Gross Domestic Product, besides generating 20% of formal employment, is noteworthy. The signs suggest that there will be regression in the economy, lower income and greater dependence.
Of course, with the consolidation of labour “reform”, privatizations and a possible “reform” of Social Security, the Bolsonaro government may reheat the economy. Unemployment, which reaches 12.4 million Brazilians, can be mitigated by the generation of precarious jobs. If the end of the Ministry of Labour is maintained, we will observe the complete elimination of the institutional guarantees that the relations with labour demand.
In foreign policy, the Bolsonaro clan has dictated the game; up to the appointment of Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo, who promises to free the Itamaraty[12] from “cultural Marxism” (whatever that means), without making clear the lines to be adopted. The tone is set by Eduardo Bolsonaro, who has been posing as a parallel chancellor, or his father’s special envoy to international missions, running over protocols and announcing the course of our foreign policy.
The announcement of intentions to review Mercosur and the revision of the Common External Tariff (TEC) would have a strong impact on the industrial sector, destination of most of our industrialized products, particularly the automotive sector. In 2017, of the total sold to the block, 93% were manufactured products. This is largely due to the TEC, which helps to protect us from external competition. Tearing down the TEC, as some want, will bring our industry direct competition from China and other Asian economies.
The reaffirmation by deputy Eduardo Bolsonaro that the Brazilian embassy in Israel will be transferred from Telaviv to Jerusalem (something done only by the United States, Guatemala and Honduras) will have negative impacts on the agribusiness sector. Beyond the commercial aspect, such a stance would distance Brazil from its historic diplomatic position of conflict mediation, in addition to becoming target of actions of the force of extremist exponents.
The very insistence on seeking to align Brazil to the United States at the time of an intense trade war with China is at least unwise. Brazil could adopt a position of neutrality and act in the mediation of tensions, and even take advantage of some commercial leverage that the dispute produces. However, by adopting an alignment with the United States and incorporating certain levels of hostility toward the Chinese into the discourse, things shift. It is always worth remembering that China, Brazil’s main trading partner, was the destination of the largest volume of Brazilian exports in 2017, reaching a figure of US $ 50 billion.
It is known that the United States, with its “America First” policy focused primarily on its internal interests, has very little to offer to Brazil and much to ask for in terms of alignment and pressure to do the dirty work that ultraconservatives in Trump’s environment wish. What would Brazil gain by playing the dirty role against Cuba and Venezuela?
In the social sphere and investments, maintaining the policy of expenditures’ ceiling and the announced measures of strong economic adjustment tend to aggravate the public health situation and the most vulnerable sectors that depend on State action. The consequences of ending the partnership of the Cuban government in the More Doctors program will aggravate the routine of improvisations and precariousness of health care.
Behaviour agendas, which may generate a greater degree of contradiction, such as the “Gag Law,” may be barred by the Federal Supreme Court. Something that might add some fuel in the beginning of the government will be the actions originating from the Ministry of Justice, run by Sergio Moro, from a structure put together in resemblance of Lava Jato Operation, with media support and actions of impact.
However, these are just projections. What we can see are nuclei disputing space and their view on certain topics. Although the formation of the ministry gives an indication of the government’s profile, there is no certainty about which line will prevail, since there are strong contradictions between the different poles.
National Congress – An arena of important disputes
Despite its inherent contradictions, the Chamber of Deputies will be a privileged stage of political dispute, mainly because it is a House, save the essentially political redundancy, and that will seek to maintain itself as an autonomous pole of power. But the Bolsonaro style is to break with the logic of coalitions and design a new model of governance. However, the legislative process is structured in the political parties; it is the college of leaders which organizes the legislative process.
To implement his government program, Bolsonaro will need support in the Parliament. Today, the main themes present in the congressional agenda are the “reform” of Social Security, the project of the “Gag Law”, the Family Statute and the reduction of minimum age of criminal responsibility. One thing is to deal with the parliamentary fronts on conservative behavioural issues, another is the agenda of economic “reforms”. The interests at stake are bigger and often contradictory, making composition and dialogue with the political parties indispensable.
Still in this post-election scenario, political forces begin to mobilize, seeking to position themselves in the new government. Even if left out of the process of forming the new government, political parties and leaderships will sooner or later impose themselves.
In this framework of strong authoritarian features, the election of the Chamber’s President[13] will be the first major dispute with the new regime. Keeping the National Congress as an autonomous power, not automatically aligned with the government, will be an important relief for the democratic environment, so politics prevails in conducting the issues that interest the country.
Starting immediately, we must move in order to guarantee a composition where the politics and the guarantee of the legislative process prevail. Ensure Parliament’s independent work and its prerogative to legislate and contain excesses.
Resistance, breadth and sagacity
Faced with this new order, we should update our tactics, reflect on ways to strengthen resistance and act with breadth and wittiness. This is a debate that begins and that we will carry out in the next months, awaiting the actual beginning of the Bolsonaro government.
Resistance, amplitude and sagacity. These are the keys to act in this new time. Resistance to face a government of rupture, which installs a new order; amplitude because we must recognize that only with a broad political movement can we cope with this new order; and sagacity to know how to exploit the contradictions in the enemy’s core.
This updating effort demands tasks in the three spheres of accumulation that we develop in the Party work: the battle of ideas, the front of the masses and the institutional struggle. These are three totalizing and synergistic spheres. Or is it not in the midst of social movements that there is an intense debate of ideas, nowadays?
In the battle of ideas, it is necessary to unveil with more depth the transformations that have been taking place in the Brazilian society and in the world, which have allowed the emergence of the Bolsonaro phenomenon, and its contradictions and limits. This should contribute to our political performance and to the political and ideological confrontation.
In the masses’ front, it will be necessary to think openly and creatively about forms of resistance and convergence of action. Discuss the role of social movements’ articulations, define common and broad strategies, bringing together sectors such as professional associations and churches, as well as intellectuals, artists, and others.
The institutional front gains even more relevance. Whether in the Chamber of Deputies, in local governments, or in our presence in federal-state governments. These positions will be strategic in the political struggle in the coming period. Our first task in this sphere will be the election of the Chamber’s President, seeking to ensure that it is a space where politics and autonomy prevail.
Radicality in the opposition to Bolsonaro lies in the amplitude of politics. And the core of our tactics will be the effort to work towards the creation of convergence between heterogeneous forces that have as a common point the defense of democracy.
The great challenge of this broad movement shall be the defense of the Democratic Rule of Law as a precondition for establishing the debate of proposals to draw the country out of the economic and political crisis. This adds to other demands, such as the defense of rights and social achievements, the defense of sovereignty and of freedoms. This will require detachment, flexibility and patience.
PCdoB’s leadership will play a key role in building this movement, especially Manuela D’Ávila and governor Flávio Dino[14], leading exponents of joint efforts to establish articulations. The Brazilian people has set the course and the north in the elections’ second round. This is the path we must follow.
PCdoB in 2018 elections
With this debate, we began a critical and self-critical assessment of our electoral outcome. Many issues presented help us to enrich our evaluation. This process began in the framework of the last National Political Commission, which appointed the preparation of more substantiated information presented by the Party’s vice-president Walter Sorrentino. Still, we highlight some aspects that seem relevant to us.
Our main victory was to re-elect the governor of the state of Maranhao, Flavio Dino, successfully, in the first round of elections; we also elected vice-governors (Luciana Santos, in Pernambuco, and Antenor Roberto, in Rio Grande do Norte); and 21 state representatives. PCdoB reached 1.44% of the valid national votes, including the votes sub judice, with more than 1% in 14 states. In the election for state representatives, 21 were elected in 10 states, totalizing 2,395,207 votes, or 2.39% of valid votes. Even with this result, PCdoB has failed to meet the antidemocratic performance clause[15]; our votes for the Chamber of Deputies totalized 1.35% (the clause requires 1.5%).
This was the outcome possible in the face of an adverse situation. We did not miss the general line. However, there was underestimation of the performance clause issue. The problem must be seen in an integral way and with a high spirit. We are working to the face this situation.
Since 2014, we have experienced a downward trend in state capitals and large urban centres. What are the real reasons for this? Just the fact that the vote of opinion has changed in profile? Which other reasons result in this fact?
Our challenge is to face the issue of PCdoB’s social insertion, to project and attract leaders as members, to establish PCdoB’s political place and own identity within the current Brazilian political-electoral system.
We have a path to follow and a greater challenge: to strengthen our presence territorially, intensify the effort to project new leadership and strengthen the place of PCdoB in the electoral political scenario.
In order to do so, it is necessary to address the issue of the social insertion of our Party, to design and join leadership, to establish PCdoB’s political place and identity within the current Brazilian electoral-political system.
Nowadays, a central concern is with regard to our political place. It is expressed in the program: it is the struggle for the realization of the Brazilian nation. Brazil, an intense dream! The sense of a project for a solidary, fraternal and developed country, where we can face all the exclusions and oppressions. We cannot give up on the struggle for the imaginary. We have to offer a vision of our destiny as a country, as a people and a nation. Our age demands more solidarity, opportunity and commitment to the common. Only so will we overcome the immense obstacles in front of our people.
We have a path to follow and a greater challenge: to strengthen our presence territorially, intensify the effort to project new leadership and strengthen the place of PCdoB in the electoral political scenario.
Unity to strengthen democracy and resistance
The Brazilian political framework undergoes a profound quality change. A government of ultraliberal character in the economy, authoritarian in politics, and retrograde in the customs, is instated. Its agenda is harmful to the interests of Brazilians and affects our sovereignty. In this context, the union of broad political, social and cultural forces becomes a necessity.
Along with this work, PCdoB moves in search of political and legal solutions to overcome the restrictive effects of the antidemocratic performance clause. This is important for the Party to better fulfil the responsibilities undertaken with the nation and the working class in almost a hundred years of history.
In the face of this situation, PCdoB and PPL have triggered a high-level political-programmatic dialogue, seeking a political and legal solution to meet the requirements, under the law, to overcome the performance clause and thus create the conditions to continue playing a relevant role in the democratic resistance and in the search for fundamental solutions for Brazil to become a prosperous, democratic, sovereign and socialist nation.
From this fruitful dialogue came the conviction that the two political parties have affinities and programmatic convergences and, in the face of the of the extreme-right president-elect and his future government, have the common understanding: the confluent tactical view that it is necessary to add a broad group of forces to undertake resistance and democratic opposition.
In common agreement, the directions of the two parties concluded that the path to achieve the proposed objectives is that of unity, whose practical, legal and viable route is the incorporation of PPL to PCdoB. This process, according to the agreed terms, based on the legislation and the statutes of the two political parties, shall take place simultaneously in the parties’ decision and deliberative bodies.
To accomplish this process, on December 1, 2018, in a congressional decision, the PPL decided to join PCdoB. We propose that this Central Committee approves the incorporation of PPL to PCdoB, which will not suffer a change in name, symbol, statutes and program. We also propose that an extraordinary Congress be convened on the 17th of March, for the election of a new Central Committee. In order to fulfil the prerogatives in the legislation, the Extraordinary Congress of PCdoB will be held in joint session with the Congress of the PPL.
Finally, we will present for approval a Draft Resolution with the nominees of the new national direction that will be deliberated on in the joint meeting of the parties’ congresses. This list is made up of 170 names, 130 being the current members of the Central Committee and 40 indicated by PPL.
On December 2, as part of this political and legal rite, the PPL and PCdoB will hold a joint session of the PCdoB Central Committee and the PPL’s Extraordinary Congress, when the incorporation of PPL into PCdoB will be announced, accompanied by a political act.
Opening pathways and face the new imposed order
As we stated in our 14th Congress, we need to open pathways, to confront the new imposed order, to resist and to act with sagacity and breadth. The central question of our time is the conformation of a broad movement, a bloc, a wide political and social front that has as its core the defense of democracy.
Comrades, despite the adversities, the immense difficulties, our people can overcome this moment which the country goes through. The democratic and patriotic field will know how to create the pathways to take the struggles of our people to another level.
As we said in our congress, amid this dense fog over Brazil, our challenge is to open up clear spaces, offer perspectives, and build resistance. We are made from a fiber that is not intimidated by adversity. Steadfast in struggle!
[1] A series of demonstrations starting in June 2013. (NT)
[2] Lava Jato Operation, or “Car-wash Operation”, is a set of ongoing investigations into corruption accusations conducted by the Brazilian Federal Police. (NT)
[3] Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT) (NT)
[4] A program against homophobia in schools, pejoratively called “gay kit”, that Bolsonaro alleged was a creation of PT’s Fernando Haddad, his main competitor, to promote homosexuality amongst kids. (NT)
[5] Members of PSDB – Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy and PT – Workers’ Party, respectively. (NT)
[6] Anos de chumbo, or “lead years”, is a reference to the 1964-1985 dictatorial regime and, also, to its worst years in policies of persecutory censorship and repression. (NT)
[7] Paulo Guedes will be Bolsonaro’s Minister of Finance. (NT)
[8] Eduardo Bolsonaro, the elected president’s son, will be part of the government. (NT)
[9] General Eduardo Villas Bôas is the Brazilian Army’s Commander. (NT)
[10] The distinctively anti-leftist project proposed by conservatives aims to ban political debate at schools, alleging that teachers are “indoctrinating” students. (NT)
[11] Jair Bolsonaro is retired Army captain in the reserve. (NT)
[12] Headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (NT)
[13] Speaker of the House. (NT)
[14] Re-elected governor of the Maranhão federal state, in Northern Brazil. (NT)
[15] The electoral threshold. (NT)
